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Abstract
The offshoring of production by multinational firms has expanded dramatically in
recent decades, increasing the potential for economic growth and technological trans-
fers. What determines the location of such offshore production? How do the policies
and characteristics of countries affect these decisions? Do firms choose specific coun-
tries because of their policies or because they are more familiar with them? In this
paper, we use a very rich dataset on Danish firms to analyze how their decisions re-
garding offshore production depend on institutional characteristics and firm-specific
bilateral connections with these countries. We find that institutions that enhance in-
vestor protections and reduce corruption increase the probability of offshoring, while
those that introduce regulatory constraints in the labor market discourage it. We also
show that offshoring activities are more likely for firms that have developed networks
in the country of destination.
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1 Introduction
The rapid increase in offshoring has been one of the most notable trends in the labor mar-
kets of several developed countries over the last three decades. The driving forces of firm
offshoring have been extensively studied (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Still, the factors that
contribute to determining domestic firm boundaries are highly debated (Barba Navaretti
et al., 2011). Firms’ decisions regarding offshore production may be described by heteroge-
neous firm models of trade such as the one proposed by Melitz (2003). In these theoretical
models, the probability of engaging in offshore production is a negative function of the entry
cost that the firm has to pay to a destination country to engage in offshore production. High
fixed cost of operating a business (e.g. due to lengthy bureacuratic procedures or inefficient
financial institutions in the destination country) may discourage firms from offshoring pro-
duction activities in some countries and direct them to other countries with lower costs.
Many empirical studies based on firm-level data show that firms engage in trade activi-
ties only if their productivity levels are high enough to cover the fixed costs (see Sofronis
K. Clerides, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; and Greenaway and Kneller, 2004, among many
others). None of these studies has identified the factors determining firms’ fixed costs for
offshoring production or measured the impact of these costs on firms’ propensity to offshore.
Partial exceptions can be identified in the literature focusing on foreign direct investment
(FDI). Olney (2013) uses a cross-country database compiled by the OECD to show that
US firms have larger FDI presence in countries with more liberal employment protection
legislation. On the other hand, Antras et al. (2009) study how the cross-border activities
of global firms relate to institutional settings with varying investor protections and levels of
capital market development. Their model predicts that arm’s length technology transfers
are more common than the deployment of this type of technology through foreign affiliate
activity in host countries where investor protections are stronger. Moreover, Antras et al.
(2009) show that the share of activity abroad financed by capital flows from multinational
parents is decreasing in the quality of investor protections in host economies.
Our study is closely related to these studies, and more generally analyzes the role of an am-
ple set of institutions and policies in the destination countries in affecting the extensive and
the intensive margin of offshoring from Danish firms. Besides analyzing labor market and
investor protection we also consider indices of corruption, measures of excessive bureaucracy
and the weak enforcement of standards during the registration process of new companies as
those may increase the fixed and operating costs of firms (Djankov et al., 2002). Similarly,
lax enforcement, such as difficulties in obtaining or recovering credit, or problems in en-
forcing contracts may hurt economic activity and reduce returns to investments (Acemoglu
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et al., 2005).
In our analysis we then focus on the role of individuals in the offshoring firm who are familiar
with the destination country, namely immigrants from those countries. We estimate if their
presence and the size of the group affects the probability and the scale of offshoring in their
countries of origin. The presence of a network of foreign workers from specific countries
can help firms gather information and navigate the local bureaucracy and culture to comply
with burdensome regulations or to obtain better access to credit. More generally, networks
can help firms reduce information asymmetries and set-up costs that arise from venturing
abroad (Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010).
Therefore, this paper has three main goals. First, we test, among a large set of institutional
settings, which ones affect the fixed costs of operating a business abroad and consequently
influence firms’ offshoring decisions. Second, we distinguish institutions and policies that
reduce propensity to offshore from those that create an ‘offshoring-friendly’ business envi-
ronment and increase offshoring. Third, we analyze whether firms’ networks in destination
countries reduce the fixed costs facilitating bilateral offshoring activites and whether the
network of immigrants is more or less effective in promoting offshoring in the presence of
some of the institutional features analyzed above.
To answer these research questions, we use three main datasets. The first one is the Doing
Business database compiled by the World Bank (see Djankov et al., 2002), which is a cross-
country database with information on regulations in over 160 countries for the period 2006-
2012. This dataset covers business regulations in the following areas: starting a business,
registering property rights, obtaining credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes,
trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. This database also
includes information on labor market regulations regarding hiring practices, hours worked,
redundancy rules and minimum wage provisions. We develop a country-specific measure for
corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project for the period 2006-
2012 (Kraay, 2010). The third data source is a Danish employer-employee matched dataset
that covers the universe of individuals and firms in the manufacturing sector for the same
period. This dataset is especially well suited for studying firms’ offshoring decisions, since
it allows international trade transactions to be measured at the firm level (Hummels et al.,
2014a) rather than at the country level (Olney, 2013). This dataset also includes extensive
information on firms’ workforce characteristics, which provides an excellent opportunity for
identifying the networks of the foreign workers in each firm.
Our main results suggest that business and labor market regulations have opposite effects
on offshoring activities. Business regulations are beneficial for the extensive margin of off-
shoring. A lack of credit coverage and the inadequate protection of creditors’ property
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rights result in high fixed costs for offshoring. Accordingly, business regulations that en-
hance credit coverage and resolve insolvency issues in destination countries tend to increase
domestic firms’ propensity to offshore. This is an interesting finding that substantiates a
widely spread negative view about business regulations (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2002) and
suggests that such regulations may be needed to ensure business quality. Conversely, labor
market regulations have a negative impact on the propensity to offshore: stringent measures
of employment protection increase firms’ labor costs, which affect negatively firms’ extensive
margin of offshoring. This result is in line with the general view that employment protection
regulations increase labor market frictions and/or labor costs. Furthermore, we find that a
lack of control of corruption in the destination country highly reduces firms’ probability of
offshoring to that destination. The impact of all these institutions on firms’ intensive mar-
gins, conditional on offshoring, is never statistically significant. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that regulations and corruption affect the fixed, rather than the variable, costs
of accessing a foreign market. We also find that a firm’s network, measured by the share
of workers from a foreign country, has a significant positive effect on the extensive margin
of offshoring in that country, consistent with its role in reducing fixed costs of offshoring.1
Several refinements of the network variable confirm the role played by foreign workers in
promoting offshoring activities at the bilateral level. We also find that the positive impact
of networks is magnified (attenuated) in destination markets with high levels of credit risk
(corruption). In this respect it looks like a thick network of immigrants can in part compen-
sate for high credit risk, possibly ensuring a level of trust and knowledg that reduces credit
risk. On the other hand immigrants may warn their firms of high level of corruption in their
own countries so that the negative effect of corruption on offshoring is enhanced in firms
with a larger network from the country.
In the next section we present a conceptual framework for the fixed costs of offshoring. Our
empirical strategy is explained in Section 3. The data and summary statistics are then dis-
cussed in Section 4. We present our results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. The
figures and tables are provided in the Appendix.
1Our findings are different from those in Ottaviano et al. (2018), who find a negative effect of network at
the bilateral level. That paper focuses on service trade and emphasizes that imported service tasks can be
substituted by immigrants working in the firm. We explore instead the offshoring of production activities
for a representative sample of firms in the manufacturing industry, where the information channle may be
more important than task substytuion.
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2 Theoretical Intuition
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model that describes the economic mechanism
that this paper focuses on. We consider a multi-country economy, with a continuum of
countries i, j ∈ [0, 1]. There are two sectors in this economy. One sector provides a single
homogeneous good. This good is used as the numeraire, and its price is set at 1. This good is
produced under perfect competition. The second sector supplies a differentiated good under
monopolistic competition: each firm is a monopoly for the variety of good that it produces,
and varieties are imperfect substitutes. All the countries produce both goods, which can be
freely traded.
2.1 Demand
We assume the world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with identical preferences.
The utility function of these consumers is increasing in the consumption of the homogeneous
good xo and in the quantity q(x) of each variety x of the differentiated good, where X is the
set of all the available varieties:
U = x1−µo
(∫
x∈X
q(x)
σ−1
σ di
)( µσ−1+σ )
. (1)
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, µ is the share of income devoted
to consumption of the differentiated good (so 1− µ represents the consumer’s expenditures
devoted to xo). Consumers choose the demand for the differentiated good that maximizes
their utility (1) subject to their budget constraint. In this typical Dixit-Stiglitz framework,
the (inverse) demand function for a single variety is
p(x) = Aq(x)−
1
σ , where A =
(
P 1−σ
µ
)−(1/σ)
. (2)
The inverse demand function (2) features an index A of the market size of the differen-
tiated sector, which is increasing in the price index P :
P =
(∫
x∈X
p(x)1−σ dx
)1/1−σ
. (3)
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2.2 Offshoring and supply
Regarding the supply of the differentiated good, in each country, there is a continuum of firms
z; these firms are heterogeneous in their productivity θz ∈ [0, 1] and produce a single variety
of the differentiated product. The production technology of firms includes both headquarter
tasks, h, and manufacturing tasks, m. Headquarter services are performed locally and thus
identify the home country of the firm. The manufacturing tasks are supplied everywhere
and can be performed in different countries, i.e., offshored abroad.
We assume that labor is the only factor of production in the economy. Labor is sup-
plied inelastically in all countries and used both to produce the homogeneous good and to
perform the tasks necessary to produce the differentiated good. Perfect competition in the
homogeneous sector and free trade imply that wage rates are set at their reservation level
and equalized across countries, so that they can be set equal to one.
Let us now consider a firm in country i that offshores production to foreign country j.
We use the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
xij(z) = θz(h)
1/2 (λjm)
1/2 . (4)
The output of firm z from country i depends on its productivity, θz
2, the local headquar-
ter’s inputs, h, and the manufacturing inputs, m, which are offshored to country j. λj > 1
is the efficiency of the labor inputs available in country j in terms of the performance of
manufacturing tasks. We assume that λi = 1, so λj > 1 implies that firms can access more
efficient manufacturing inputs by offshoring production. Finally, note that the production
function (4) features technology that is equally intensive for manufacturing and headquarter
services.
All firms incur a positive fixed cost f > 1 when they start production. An additional
positive fixed cost, rj > 0, is paid by firms when they offshore production to country j, e.g.,
due to a different functioning of the institutions there (such as weaker enforcement of judi-
cial institutions, higher regulatory constraints, and higher levels of corruption), information
frictions, and linguistic barriers. However, some of these entry costs are attenuated when a
firm has a specific network in country j (e.g. created by the firm’s workers who originate
from country j), 0 < φzj ≤ 1.3
2As the productivity distribution is country-specific, we should also add subscript i. However, for the
sake of simplicity, we omit it, and as we focus on country i, this does not reduce expositional clarity.
3The combined assumptions of f > 1, rj > 0 and 0 < φzj ≤ 1 imply that the network benefits do not
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The profit function of an offshoring firm is
piij(z) = pxij(z)− (h+m)− (f + rj − φzj). (5)
We now substitute demand (2) and the production function (4) into (5). After some
simplifications, we obtain:
piij(z) = A
(
θz(h)
1/2 (λjm)
1/2
)−1+σ
σ − (h+m)− (f + rj − φzj). (6)
The firm chooses h and m to maximize (6). From the first order conditions, we obtain
the input demand for the offshoring firm:
m∗(z) = h∗(z) =
(
A
2
)σ (
σ − 1
σ
)σ
λ
σ−1
2
j θ
σ−1
z (7)
where m∗ = h∗ follows because headquarters and manufacturing services have the same
intensity in the production function. If we substitute (7) back into (6), then we obtain the
equilibrium profits of the offshoring firm:
pi∗ij(z) = 2
1−σAσ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ (
1
σ − 1
)
λ
1
2
(σ−1)
j θ
(σ−1)
z − (f + rj − φzj). (8)
From the condition pi∗ij(z) > 0, we derive the productivity threshold faced by firms that
offshore production abroad:
θ > θˆzj, where θˆzj =
2σ
(σ − 1)A σ−1+σ γj1/2
(σ (f + rj − φzj)) 1−1+σ (9)
Only firms characterized by a productivity level θ > θˆzj that is sufficiently high will find
it profitable to offshore production to country j. According to (9), θˆzj depends on the size
of the differentiated good sector (A); therefore, we define the following lemma.
Lemma : More firms will offshore production when the size of the differentiated sector
increases, i.e., dθˆzj/dA < 0.
When the size of the differentiated sector increases, more firms will be needed to satisfy
the increased demand for consumption. Put differently, as θˆzj decreases, more firms will find
completely offset the fixed costs. These assumptions are necessary to guarantee economies of scale for the
firms.
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it profitable to offshore production.
According to equation (9), the number of offshoring firms also depends on the efficiency
of country j in tasks m (λj), the internal economies of scale (f), the institutions of the
destination country (rj) and the networks that are available in the destination country (φzj).
To analyze these effects, it is convenient to compare the offshoring condition (9) with the
one that domestic firms in country i have to meet to engage in production locally. If the
manufacturing tasks are completed locally, then firms are not exposed to different institutions
(i.e., ri = 0). In addition, they are able to maximize local network benefits (i.e., φzi = 1).
However, these firms can only access labor inputs that have low efficiency (i.e., λi = 1):
θ > θzi, where θzi =
2σ
(σ − 1)A σ−1+σ (σ (f − 1))
1
−1+σ . (10)
It easily follows that the number of offshoring firms relative to non-offshoring firms
depends on the following ratio:
Θoff =
θzi
θˆzj
=
(
f − 1
f + rj − φzj
)1/(σ−1)
λ
1/2
j . (11)
From (11), we obtain three theoretical predictions that provide the basis for our empirical
strategy:
Proposition 1: The number of offshoring firms decreases when institutional fixed costs
increase, i.e., dΘoff/drj < 0.
Proposition 2: The number of offshoring firms increases when the size of the network
in the destination country increases, i.e., dΘoff/dφzj > 0.
Proposition 3: The number of offshoring firms increases when the efficiency of m tasks
increases in the destination country, i.e., dΘoff/dλj > 0.
The intuitions derived from this simple theoretical framework serve the sole purpose of
guiding the empirical analysis on the effects of institutions and networks on firms’ offshoring
decisions. In the next section, we conduct an empirical test of these theoretical predictions.
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3 Empirical Strategy
The primary objective of our empirical analysis is to formally test Propositions 1 and 2.
We construct an empirical specification where changes in the fixed costs associated with
institutions in the destination country j and the strength of the firm i’s networks in j affect
firm i’s offshoring decisions. Our baseline specification is the following bilateral regression
equation:
Offijmct = α + r
′
jt−1β + γφijt−1 +X
′
it−1ζ + θi + θj + θmt + θc + ijt (12)
where Offijmct measures either the extensive margin of offshoring (i.e., the decision to
offshore to destination j) or the intensive margin of offshoring (i.e., the volume of offshoring
activities to destination j conditional on offshoring) of firm i in manufacturing industry m
localized in municipality c at time t. As we clarify later in the data section, the detailed
Danish custom data allow us to measure offshoring as the purchases of inputs belonging to
the same industry as that of production firms.
The first set of explanatory variables in equation (12) is the vector rjt−1, which includes
the institutional fixed costs, e.g. due to labor, business, credit regulations and corruption in
destination country j at year t− 1 (see the data section below for a detailed description of
these institutional costs). Changes in national regulations and corruption levels are therefore
used to mimic changes to the bilateral costs of offshoring, which are external to Denmark
and vary across destination countries. The idea is that several countries still have inefficient
institutional settings that prevent the enforcement of contracts, and property rights limit
competition or keep production costs at a high level. When these inefficiencies become
smaller (larger) in a country, e.g., as a result of national policy making, (Viscusi et al., 2005),
the costs of operating a business in that country decrease (increase). We can therefore use
regulatory reforms to simulate changes in cross-border firm investments. These changes can
reasonably be considered to be exogenous from the perspective of a single enterprise. In this
respect, the effects on Danish firms are fairly comparable to tariff reductions (increases), as
Danish firms have a very limited influence on the outcome of reform processes outside of
Denmark. A potential threat to this identification strategy is that shocks originating with
Danish firms could affect the markets and the regulatory frameworks of their foreign suppliers
or foreign customers. These shocks could be an issue for a large country, such as the United
States, but Denmark is a small country of less than six million people and represents a small
share of trade, both in the aggregate and for individual partners and products (Hummels
et al., 2014a). It is important to note that all the variables included in the vector rjt−1
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are lagged one period to account for the fact that companies cannot immediately adjust
offshoring activities in response to changes in destination markets’ institutions.
Equation (12) also includes the explanatory variable φijt−1, which proxies for the strength
of firm i’s networks in destination country j. This variable is computed as the firm’s share
of foreign workers from country j at time t − 1. Unobserved firm-specific shocks could
influence both the hiring of foreign workers and offshoring. Firms that intend to offshore to
a destination country may intentionally hire foreign workers from that country, which is the
most obvious source of endogeneity and introduces a spurious positive bias in our network
coefficient. We therefore pursue an instrumental variable approach that addresses these
endogeneity issues. Specifically, the instrument is the predicted share of foreign workers
in municipality c, which represents the home of the firm at time t − 1. Specifically, we
use a shift-share approach by assigning the number of immigrants in a given year to the
municipalities where their countrymen were located in 1996, i.e., ten years before our sample
starts:
φIVjct−1 =
Fjt−1 ∗ (Fjc96/Fj96)
Pc96
(13)
where Fjt−1 is the national stock of immigrants from country j in period t − 1. These
immigrants are allocated to municipality c based on the share of migrants from the same
country j in year 1996 (i.e., Fjc96/Fj96). This approach assumes that new immigrants migrate
to cities mainly based on family and friend networks rather than changing local economic
conditions, which could be endogenous. By construction, the instrument relies on the pre-
determined distribution of immigrants across municipalities in 1996 and the subsequent
tendency of new migrants to reside in migrant enclaves. This product is then normalized
by total employment in the municipality c in 1996 (Pc96) to generate a predicted network
variable at the municipality-year level.4 Figure 1 plots the bilateral share of foreign workers
in a municipality against its instrument. A significant positive relationship reassures that
our instrument is a strong predictor of the bilateral share of foreign workers in the firm. This
figure offers a visual inspection of the first-stage IV coefficients that are discussed later in
the section (5).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
It is possible that the distribution of migrant workers across local labor markets in the
base year reflects endogenous economic factors that are persistent over time. We test for
4See Card (2005) for additional details on the shift-share approach.
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this potential violation of our exclusion restriction in Table 1. Long-run changes within the
municipality in our bilateral instrument are not correlated with the pre-sample trends in
the destination-specific offshoring outcomes. Specifically a change in the instrument from
2006 to 2012 at the municipality level is unrelated to the pre-2000 trend of the extensive
margin of offshoring (column 1) or the pre-2000 trend of the intensive margin of offshoring
(column 2). However, column 3 shows that our bilateral instrument is a strong predictor of
the network variable at the municipality level. Changes in our instrumental variable are in
fact positively correlated with changes in the bilateral share of foreign workers (column 3).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Equation (12) allows us to directly test Propositions 1 and 2. The test of Proposition
1, on the effect of institutional fixed costs on firms’ offshoring can be summarized by the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: β < (=)0 for the extensive (intensive) margin of offshoring. The co-
efficient β measures the bilateral impact of an increase in the fixed costs associated with
institution r on the decision of firm i to offshore in country j. This coefficient is predicted
to be negative (zero), as the extensive (intensive) margin of the offshoring is assumed to be
negatively related to (independent from) an increase in the fixed cost of offshoring.
Notice that this prediction implies a negative effect of fixed institutional costs on the
extensive margin of offshoring only. Proposition 1 is in fact derived in a Melitz-type theo-
retical framework, in which the fixed costs affect the firms’ decisions to offshore production
tasks and not the firms’ offshoring volumes (conditional on offshoring).
The empirical test of Proposition 2, on the effects of networks on firms’ offshoring, can
be summarized by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: γ > (=)0, for the extensive (intensive) margin of offshoring. The co-
efficient γ measures the impact of a network between firm i and destination j , which can
help firm i decrease the total fixed costs of offshoring to that destination. This coefficient
is predicted to be positive (zero), as the extensive (intensive) margin of the offshoring is as-
sumed to be positively related to (independent from) a decrease in the fixed cost of offshoring.
This prediction states that a strong bilateral network between firm i and destination j
is expected to facilitate its cross-border transactions with j. Networks with country j are
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assumed to help firm i reduce all the fixed costs rather than only those associated with
each regulation r. This assumption is consistent with the notion that foreign workers bring
with them knowledge and contacts in their country of origin that promote bilateral trade
relations. Note also that this prediction only considers the extensive margin.
While they are not subject to a formal empirical test, Lemma and Proposition 3 regard-
ing the role of market size and firm productivity offer a theoretical micro-foundation for our
empirical specification. The vector of firm level controls Xit−1 includes firm productivity,
capital intensity, foreign ownership, the number of offshoring destinations and size. Further-
more, the same vector also considers detailed workforce characteristics, such as employees’
average education level, age, tenure and work experience. Moreover, the detailed nature of
our dataset allows us to include a comprehensive set of fixed effects, including firm fixed
effects, θi, industry by year fixed effects, θmt, destination fixed effects, θj, and municipality
fixed effects, θc. Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the destination-municipality-
year level.
4 Data
We use three main data sources. The first one is Doing Business, a cross-country database
that provides information on approximately 160 countries over the period 2006-2012. This
dataset was developed by the World Bank, follows the methodology proposed by Djankov
et al. (2002), and is constantly updated and expanded. This database covers business and
credit regulations in the following areas: starting a business, registering property rights,
paying taxes, trading across borders, obtaining credit, and protecting minority investors.
This database also measures labor market regulations on hiring practices, hours worked,
redundancy rules and minimum wage provisions.5 The second dataset includes information
on a country-specific measure of corruption, which is obtained from the WGI project (Kraay,
2010). This measure is based on the inverse of the estimated governance component related
to the ”control of corruption”, i.e., a higher indicator in our dataset corresponds to higher
levels of perceived corruption.6
5Recent updates of this dataset include information on business regulations on the provision of electricity,
construction permits and labor market regulations on severance payments. However, we do not consider these
regulations in this analysis as they are available for a large group of countries only from 2014 on.
6The original Control of Corruption (CC) indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the
”abduction” of the state by elites and private interests. We use the inverse of this estimated governance
indicator in standard normal units, ranging approximately from -2.5 (low levels of perceived corruption) to
2.5 (high levels of perceived corruption).
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The third dataset combines the following three main registers on firms and their employ-
ees, which are collected by the official Danish statistical institute (Danmarks Statistik): the
“Integrated Database for Labor Market Research” (IDA), the “Accounting Statistics Regis-
ter” (FirmStat), and the “Foreign Trade Statistics Register” (Udenrigshandelsstatistikken).
The IDA is a longitudinal employer-employee register that compiles information on the
age, gender, nationality, education, occupation, and wages of individuals aged 15-74 between
1980 and 2012. The information is updated once a year in week 48. Apart from deaths
and permanent migrations, there is no attrition in the data. The individual information
in IDA is used to measure detailed workforce composition characteristics at the firm level,
as explained in the next section. Among other things, this information includes the share
of foreign workers from each destination country j, the share of male employees, and the
workers’ average age, education level and work experience. Because we can track people over
time, we can also establish the average tenure of all employees since 1980.
FirmStat is a firm register that provides the annual value of capital stock, the produc-
tivity and the industry affiliation of firms over the period 1995-2012.7 These data capture
some of the salient firm-level characteristics included in all of our regression models, which
are described in the next section.
The “Foreign Trade Statistics Register” includes import purchases (and export sales)
and the number of imported (exported) products at the firm level over the period 1995-2012.
These data are available both for specific destinations and aggregated over all destinations.
Import (and export) volumes are recorded in the Danish kroner (DKK) according to the
8-digit combined nomenclature as long as the transaction is worth at least 7, 500 DKK or
involves goods whose weight is at least 1, 000 kg.8
From the population of all firms, we retain only manufacturing firms with at least 10
employees. Thus, we obtain an unbalanced panel of approximately 2, 000 firms over the
period 2006 − 2012. Regardless of its offshoring status, each firm is assigned to all 160
destinations, for which the Doing Business dataset is not missing any information on business
or labor market regulations.
7Capital stock includes the sum of the value (in the Danish kroner) of land, buildings, machines, equipment
and inventory. Firm productivity, which is the most important predictor of firms’ internationalization in
recent trade theory, is calculated as turnover per employee in logarithmic scale (i.e., labor productivity).
We deflate all the monetary values using the World Bank’s GDP deflator, with 2005 as the base year.
Approximately 16 percent of the firms in the final sample have imputed accountings. Excluding these
observations from the main sample provides almost identical results to those reported in the paper. These
additional results are available on request from the authors.
87, 500 DKK are valued at about 1, 000 euros at the time of writing. Since the introduction of the euro
currency, the Danish Central Bank has adopted a fixed exchange rate policy vis-a-vis the euro.
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Using data from the Foreign Trade Statistics Register, we construct a firm-level measure
of offshoring. Following Hummels et al. (2014b), we use a “narrow offshoring” measure that
is constructed as the sum of imports for the same product category as firm exports and
domestic sales.9 This narrow measure of offshoring rule out the imports of raw materials
that are inconsistent with standard definitions of offshoring.10 We look at two aspects of
offshoring. First, we analyze whether regulations and networks affect the decisions of firms
to begin offshoring production activities in a destination market (i.e., the extensive margin
of offshoring). Second, in order to corroborate the interpretation on the results obtained
for the extensive margin, we also estimate the impact of institutions and networks on firms’
values of bilateral offshoring, conditional on firms already offshoring in a destination market
(i.e., the intensive margin of offshoring).
Figure 2 presents evidence on the distribution of offshoring across manufacturing indus-
tries in Denmark. We report the twelve industries with the highest share of offshoring firms.
Offshoring is common in routine, lower-skilled industries such as motor vehicles, machinery
and equipment, basic metals and textiles, where more than forty percent of firms offshore.11
We deem these descriptive statistics to be reasonable because they are consistent with exist-
ing findings that the offshoring of routine, lower-skilled jobs is relatively common (Hummels
et al., 2014b), and they indicate that our measure is successfully capturing offshoring in the
data.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The most popular offshoring destinations over the period 2006-2012 are reported in
Figure 3. Most of the neighbouring countries are included in the top 12 destinations of
Danish offshoring. The EU is in fact the recipient of 58 percent of Danish offshoring, with
Norway, Germany and Sweden representing the top three destinations. These patterns are
consistent with the known fact that most offshoring takes place among developed countries.
Many of the neighboring Eastern European countries are included in the top 20 destinations
of Danish offshoring. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, in fact, represent
some of the largest recipients of Danish offshoring.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
9The first 6-digits of the Combined Nomenclature in the Foreign Trade Statistics Register are aggregated
to the 4-digit level to considerably improve consistency over time.
10In the sensitivity analysis, we use an alternative ”broad offshoring” measure that includes all the imports
of a given firm in a given year, independently of the product code.
11These findings are consistent with a distinct measure of offshoring based on survey data for Denmark
(Bernard et al., 2017a).
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4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
According to our destination-specific definition of offshoring, the average offshoring rate at
the firm level across all destination countries is 3 percent. Focusing on the intensive margin
of offshoring, we see that the average volume of offshoring to each destination, conditional
on offshoring, is approximately 30,000 dkk at the firm level.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Given the detailed employer-employee matched data, we are able to control for an ex-
tensive set of firm and workforce-level characteristics. First, we are able to measure our
network variable, φijt−1, as the firm share of foreign workers from country j at time t − 1.
Second, we can extend our specification with the following firm level controls: productivity,
size, capital intensity, the number of offshoring destinations, multi-establishment and foreign
ownership dummies. We also consider employees’ nationality, gender, occupation, average
age, education, tenure, and work experience. The summary statistics for the networks and
control variables are reported at the bottom of Table 1.
Table 3 reports the main descriptive statistics for the measures of fixed costs associated
with the institutions of the country of destination. These costs are derived from the indicators
of labor, business and credit regulations collected by the World Bank at the country level.
Specifically, the labor regulations include the following: i) whether fixed term contracts
are prohibited for permanent tasks; ii) the maximum number of working days per week,
calculated as 7-the maximum allowed number of working days; iii) whether employers must
notify or consult a third party before a collective dismissal of employees; and iv) the minimum
wage (measured as the ratio of the minimum wage relative to median wages). We combine the
labor regulations with the principal component analysis (PCA) to calculate an index that
summarizes the institutional costs due to labor market rigidity. The business regulations
include the following: i) the time required to start a business (in days); ii) the time required
to register property (in days); iii) the time required to prepare and pay taxes (in hours);
and iv) the time required to export goods (in days). The corresponding PCA index is also
reported in the same table. Finally the credit related costs in our empirical analysis include
the following: i) the lack of private credit bureau coverage (percent of adults), computed as
100-private credit bureau coverage; ii) the lack of an investors’ protection index, calculated
as 10-business extent of disclosure index (the disclosure index ranges from 0=less disclosure
to 10=more disclosure); iii) the cost of enforcing contracts (percent of claims)12 and viii) the
12The cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, which is assumed to be equivalent to 200 percent
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rate of insolvency, calculated as 100-the recovery rate (cents on the dollar). The PCA index
of credit risk is obtained by combining these credit related items. The last row of Table 2
shows the main descriptive statistics of our country-specific corruption index, which is based
on the inverse of the estimated control of corruption indicator (Kraay, 2010).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Figure 4 shows how the regulations and our measure of corruption described in Table
3 changed from 2006 to 2012 across different destination countries by plotting the index in
a given area in 2006 against the same index in 2012 for a given economy. A few things
are worth noting. First, there are substantial time-series variations in each index as the
large majority of destination countries do not lie on the 45-degree line, which is exactly the
temporal variation we will exploit in our empirical analysis. Second, whereas most of the
destination countries have experienced a reduction in business regulations and credit risk
over the sample period, the trends for the index of labor market rigidity and our measure of
corruption are less clear-cut.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 5 shows the destination countries with the highest index along each of the four
dimensions described in Table 3. It is interesting to note that 5 destinations with the highest
index of business regulations (Angola, Chad, Haiti, Iraq, Ukraine and Venezuela) are among
the countries with the highest credit risk scores, as reported in the two second and third
panels, respectively. Furthermore, the second and fourth panels of Figure 5 reveal that the
5 destinations with the highest corruption index are also among the countries featuring the
highest credit risk. We do not observe the same overlap across destinations if we compare the
country ranking in terms of the index of labor market rigidity to the other three rankings.
This result is confirmed by the fact that there is a relatively low and negative correlation
between the index of labor market rigidity and the other three indexes, whereas the index of
business regulation is highly and positively correlated with the index of credit risk and the
corruption index.13
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
of income per capita or 5,000 dollars, whichever is greater. Three types of costs are recorded: court costs,
enforcement costs and average attorney fees.
13The correlation coefficient between the index of labor market rigidity and the index of business regulation
(index of credit risk) is -0.22 (-0.26). The correlation coefficient between the index of business regulation
and the index of credit risk (corruption index) is 0.56 (0.70).
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Our main hypothesis suggests that regulations entailing higher institutional costs, higher
levels of perceived corruption or a weaker network will reduce a firm’s extensive margin for
offshore production abroad. To provide preliminary insights into these relationships, Fig-
ure 6 shows separate scatter plots of our indexes of labor market rigidity, business regula-
tions, credit risk, corruption and networks against the extensive margin of offshoring at the
destination-year level. A statistically significant negative (positive) relationship is evident
between our indexes (the network) and the average share of firms that offshore at the year-
destination level. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of offshoring firms decreases
(increases) when the institutional fixed costs (networks) increase. Furthermore, Figure 7
plots our indexes and networks variable against the average log of offshoring values at the
year-destination level. The intensive margin of offshoring does not correlate with either the
institutions or the network. This result does not contradict our theory, which predicts a neg-
ative (positive) relationship between institutional costs (networks) and the extensive margin
of offshoring only. It is encouraging that such significant relationships emerge in the data,
even though they are raw. Next, we examine whether these results hold in a more rigorous
empirical specification that controls for a large set of confounding factors.
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here]
5 Results
In what follows, we first discuss the main results regarding the impact of institutions and
networks on firms’ extensive and intensive margins of offshoring. They are obtained from
the estimation of equation (12). We then investigate how institutions and networks interact
with each other. Then, we show extensions, checks and refinements of the main results.
5.1 Main results
Table 4 presents the baseline results showing the impact of regulations and networks on the
extensive margin of offshoring. In column 1, we report a specification showing the impact of
regulations, corruption and networks on the extensive margin of offshoring after controlling
for only industry by year, firm and municipality fixed effects. In this basic specification, we
see that the presence of employment protection measures, weaker credit coverage, a lower
resolving insolvency index and higher corruption in the destination market at time t − 1
leads to a significant decrease in the bilateral probability that a firm will offshore to that
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destination at time t.14 None of the business regulations are significantly associated with the
bilateral probability of offshoring.15 In contrast, our network variable is positively associated
with the firm’s extensive margin at the bilateral level. In Columns 2-4, we sequentially
include firm-level controls (such as labor productivity) and destination country fixed effects
in the specification. Furthermore the network variable is instrumented for by using its shift-
share prediction, as described in equation (13).16 The coefficients for the institutions remain
unchanged after controlling for the numerous firm characteristics and fixed effects, whereas
the instrumented coefficient estimated on the network variable is of smaller size, which is
consistent with the upward bias hypothesis highlighted in the methodological section. The
same coefficients are never statistically significant when we consider the intensive margin,
conditional on the decision to offshore (see Columns 5-8).17
We interpret all these results as being consistent with our two main hypotheses, which are
highlighted in the methodological section. On one hand, in line with Hypothesis (1), the
presence of restrictive employment protection legislations, high levels of perceived corruption,
and the lack of credit coverage and credit solvency represent proxies for the institutional costs
of offshoring to a certain destination country. These are some of the fixed costs that hinder
the early stages of firms’ offshoring (i.e., firms’ extensive margin) but do not affect the
volume of offshoring activities, conditional on having accessed a specific foreign market. On
the other hand, consistent with Hypothesis (2), a firm’s network in the country of destination
helps the firm reduce the overall fixed costs (Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010), which, in
turn, positively affects the extensive margin but not the offshoring volume, conditional on
offshoring. Furthermore, the estimated positive effect of labor productivity at the firm level
on offshoring is intuitive and consistent with a Melitz-type theoretical framework when we
focus on the extensive margin of the offshoring decision.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To simplify the interpretation of our main results, we now present the effects of regula-
tions identified by using the aggregate PCA indexes, which are calculated as highlighted in
14To simplify the comparison across the magnitudes involved in each estimation, all the regression tables
show standardized coefficients estimated on the z-score of each explanatory variable.
15This result is likely due to the fact that our credit variables are highly correlated with business regula-
tions. If we estimate a simpler specification in which credit and business regulations are entered separately
in the extensive margin equation, we find that they are all significantly and negatively associated with the
bilateral probability of offshoring.
16The first-stage results, which are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4, show that the instrument has
a significant positive impact on our network variable.
17Very similar results are obtained by using an alternative measure of intensive margin, which is calculated
as the share of destination-specific imports in total imports.
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the previous section. Column 1 of Table 5 includes the coefficients estimated for the index
of labor market rigidity, business regulations and credit risk in the most complete specifica-
tion for the extensive margin. These results are in line with the findings obtained with the
disaggregated measures: although business regulations do not affect the extensive margin,
an increase in labor market rigidity and credit risk in the destination country significantly
reduces the firm’s bilateral probability of offshoring.18 Quantitatively, our regression analysis
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the index of labor market rigidity19 at
time t − 1 will lead to a 0.007 decrease in the probability of offshoring, i.e., a 20 percent
decrease in the firm’s extensive margin of offshoring.20 The impact of credit risk is about
half this much: the firm’s bilateral probability of offshoring is reduced by 10 percent at time
t when there is a one standard deviation increase in the related index at time t− 1.21 Con-
sistent with the results reported in Table 4, our measure of corruption negatively affects the
probability of offshoring: a one standard deviation increase in the corruption index decreases
the extensive margin by approximately 3 percent.22 Furthermore, the presence of a network
in the country of destination at the municipality in which the firm is localized at time t− 1
positively affects the extensive margin. According to the instrumented coefficient, a one
standard deviation increase in the firm’s network leads to a 0.010 increase in the probability
of offshoring, which corresponds to an increase of approximately 32 percent in the extensive
margin. We deem that all the effects estimated on our measures of institutional costs and
networks are sizeable from an economic point of view. In fact, these effects have a similar or
stronger predictive power than the one estimated on productivity: a one standard deviation
increase in the firm’s productivity is in fact associated with only a 3 percent increase in the
probability of offshoring.
18As mentioned in Section 4.1, destinations with high credit risk also tend to have numerous business
regulations, which may explain the lack of significance observed for the index of business regulations. In
fact, when we add these indexes separately in the main specification, the estimated coefficients are all negative
and statistically significant. These additional results are available on request from the authors.
19This approximately corresponds to an increase in labor market rigidity from the level of Austria, whose
average index is at the median of the distribution, to that of Portugal, whose average index is at the 95th
percentile of the distribution.
20This figure is calculated by dividing our standardized coefficient by 100 for the average firm’s probability
of offshoring reported at the bottom of Table 5.
21This approximately corresponds to an increase in credit risk from the level of Germany, whose average
index is at the median of the distribution, to that of Macedonia, whose average index is at the 95th percentile
of the distribution.
22This approximately corresponds to an increase in the corruption index from the level of France, whose
average index is at the 25th percentile of the distribution, to that of Azerbaijan, whose average index is at
the 90th percentile of the distribution.
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5.2 Refinements of the main results: the role of interactions
In the next step, we proceed by exploring whether the institutional indexes interact with
the network variable in column 2 of Table 5 .23 Such exercise reveals whether the presence
of a network of immigrants plays a stronger role in countries where local institutions are
particularly poor. This may be because in cases of poor institutional features the network
provides information to reduce risk or to increase knowledge. We find a positive and sig-
nificant interaction between the network variable and the credit risk index. This suggests
that the positive effect of a network is magnified in destinations characterized by high credit
risk. Networks are more effective in promoting offshoring to those destination markets with
higher credit risk. This result suggests that a local network may act as a substitute for
institutions that guarantee creditors (i.e., reduce the costs associated with credit risk) and
increase the firm’s bilateral probability of offshoring to a certain destination. On the other
hand we do not find significant effect of interactions between networks and the other two
indices. Furthermore, the measure of corruption interacts negatively with the network vari-
able: the positive effect of networks is in fact reduced in destinations characterized by high
levels of corruption. Networks are therefore less effective in promoting offshoring in corrupt
environments and vice versa.
To simplify the interpretation of all these findings, we plot the estimated marginal effect
of our network variable on the extensive margin against the whole distribution of the two
indexes of credit risk and corruption. Specifically, the top (bottom) panels of Figure 8 re-
port the estimated marginal effects of our network against the standardized index of credit
risk (corruption) by setting the indexes of business regulations, labor market rigidity and
corruption (credit risk) at respectively the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the distribu-
tion of these indexes.24 These plots confirm the substitutability (complementarity) between
our network variable and the index of credit risk (the corruption index), given that the im-
23The interactions of our regulation indexes with the network variable are instrumented by their interac-
tions with the shift share prediction described in equation (13).
24The standard errors of these marginal effects are calculated to account for all the covariance terms
involved in the fully interacted specification, as in the following interaction specification:
Offijmt = α+ γ1φijt−1 + β1index labrigjt−1 + β2index busregjt−1 +
β3index credriskjt−1 + β4index corrupjt−1 + γ2(φijt−1)(index labrigjt−1) + γ3(φijt−1)
(index busregjt−1) + γ4(φijt−1)(index credriskjt−1) + γ5(φijt−1)(index corrupjt−1) +X ′it−1ζ + θi + λj +
ηm + ρt + ijt
The marginal effects of our network variable φijt−1 reported in the top panels of Figure 8 are calculated as
follows:
dOffijmt
dφijt−1
= γ1 + γ2 ¯index labrigjt−1 + γ3 ¯index busregjt−1 + γ4index credriskjt−1 + γ5 ¯index corrupjt−1
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pact of the former increases (decreases) as the credit risk index (corruption index) in the
destination country becomes higher for given levels of the other indexes. Interestingly, the
marginal effects plotted in the top (bottom) panels of Figure 8 reset to a lower (higher)
level when we select higher moments of the corruption (credit risk) index. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficients for our network variable retain their statistical significance along the
whole distribution of the two indexes, i.e., credit risk and corruption.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
Similar results regarding the interaction effects are obtained in a simpler specification,
in which we only include the variable for the presence of labor employment protection and
a PCA index of credit risk calculated by combining the variables on credit coverage and
resolving insolvency (see column 3 of Table 5).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Consistently our two main hypothesis, none of the coefficients discussed in Table 5 is
precisely estimated in the regression for the intensive margins (columns 4-6).25
5.3 Refinements of the main results: alternate measure of net-
works
Our main analysis uses the bilateral share of foreign workers at the firm level to measure
whether a firm has a network in the destination country. This section examines whether our
results hold using alternative definitions for networks. Specifically, columns 3 and 4 of Table
6 use the firm’s bilateral share of white-collar foreign workers at time t − 1 as the network
variable. Columns 5 and 6 focus on the share of blue-collar foreign workers. For these
where ¯index labrigjt−1, ¯index busregjt−1 and ¯index corrupjt−1 are alternatively set at either the 25th, 50th
or 75th percentile of the corresponding index distribution. The variance in the marginal effects is calculated
by considering the covariance across all the different indexes included in the main specification.
25We have also investigated whether there exists a significant interaction between the institution variables.
Namely we have analyzed whether the presence of rigidities/imperfections in one dimension is magnified by
the presence of rigidities in another dimension. The individual effects, estimated in this specification are
consistent with the findings reported in column 1, and none of the interaction is significant at standard
levels. These results, which are available on request from the authors, suggest that the linear specification
is reasonably good for our institutional variables and each factor affects offshoring independently from the
other.
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estimations, we construct analogous instruments using the predicted immigration of white-
and blue-collar workers in the municipality in which the firm is located at time t − 1. The
results obtained by using these two narrower definitions of networks are qualitatively similar
to the main results re-reported in columns 1 and 2 for comparison purposes, i.e., networks
significantly affect the extensive margin of offshoring but not its intensive margin. In terms
of the magnitudes of these coefficients, the positive effect of the network provided by white-
collar workers is stronger than that reported for the blue-collar workers. Specifically, a one
standard deviation increase in the share of white-collar foreign workers doubles the bilateral
probability of offshoring, whereas the same effect estimated on the blue-collar network is
half as much as the one estimated in the main analysis, i.e., approximately 15 percent.
These additional findings reveal that foreign workers in white-collar occupations (managers,
middle managers and professionals) bring with them destination-specific knowledge that can
promote offshoring activities in their country of origin more effectively compared to their
blue-collar counterparts. Similarly, in columns 7 and 8 of Table 6, we estimate the impact
of hiring managers from domestic companies that offshore to a specific destination country.
Our results show that domestic firms poaching managers with destination-specific offshoring
experience are 14 percent more likely to offshore to the same destination country at time t
but do not feature higher offshoring volumes, conditional on offshoring. This poaching effect
on offshoring is consistent with the findings reported in Mion et al. (2017), according to which
export experience gained by managers in previous firms improves the export performance of
their current firm. All these results combined together reveal that workers with destination-
specific knowledge, which is either acquired from their country of origin or gained in previous
companies, help domestic firms reduce the fixed costs of offshoring to a specific destination
country, especially if they are in a white collar occupation.
Our main results on the network variable are also confirmed, when we use the base-
year method to address the endogeneity of the network variable instead of relying on the
shift-share instrumental variable approach. In columns 8 and 9, our network variable is
measured as the firm-level bilateral share of foreign workers at the base-year, which should
be predetermined with respect to the current offshoring decision. The base year is generally
set at 2005, i.e., one year before the estimation sample starts. If a firm enters the market
and imports at any time during our sample period, we treat its first year of existence as
the pre-sample year and focus our estimation on the subsequent changes in offshoring. The
results obtained from this alternative approach confirm the main results for the instrumental
variable (IV), i.e., networks impact the bilateral probability of offshoring but not offshoring
volumes. The size of the coefficient estimated on the extensive margin is twice as large as
that obtained in the main analysis: a one standard deviation increase in the base year share
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of foreign workers increases the current bilateral probability of offshoring by 60 percent.
Finally, columns 11 and 12 of Table 6 focus on the bilateral share of foreign workers
in the municipality in which the firm is located at time t − 1 rather than the number of
foreign workers in the firm. The instrument, however, is still the shift-share prediction at
the municipality level. Using the share of municipality-level immigrants is less specific, but
the advantage is that firm-specific endogeneity issues are less severe. In addition, immigration
may influence offshoring decisions not only directly through the hiring of foreign employees
but also more generally by promoting the development of informal networks with foreign
workers employed in other companies in the local labor market (which is proxied by the
municipality in which the firm is located). The results obtained with this broader measure
of networks are almost identical to the baseline results: a one standard deviation increase
in the bilateral share of foreign workers within the municipality at year t − 1 increases the
extensive margin by 33 percent and the corresponding effect on the intensive margin is not
statistically significant. Ultimately, the results in Table 6 demonstrate that our findings on
the network effects are robust to a variety of alternate definitions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
5.4 Additional sensitivity analysis
In this section we evaluate how the coefficients estimated for the institution and network
variables change when we, for example, focus on specific sub-samples of firms or when we use
alternative specifications for our index variables. To simplify the presentation of these sensi-
tivity exercises, we only discuss the results obtained from the specification used in columns
1 and 5 of Table 5, i.e., the one featuring the PCA indexes of institutional costs (i.e., labor
market rigidity, business regulations, credit risk and corruption) and the network variable.
5.4.1 Non-linear specifications
While our model predicts that lower institutional costs (stronger networks) in the destination
markets are positively associated with the firms’ bilateral extensive margin of offshoring, it
is silent on the curvature of these relationships. To explore the existence of non-linearities
in the effects discussed so far, we consider an additional specification, in which we add the
squares of the institutional indexes and of the network variable. The results are reported
in the first two columns Table 7. Our main results are confirmed: in all the specifications,
23
higher levels of labor market rigidity, credit risk and corruption in the destination market
negatively influence the firm’s bilateral probability of offshoring, whereas stronger networks
are positively related to this probability. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in support
of a convex relationship for the network variable and the labor rigidity and credit risk indexes.
The existence of a non-linear relationship between offshoring and the corruption index is not
supported by our results: the coefficient estimated on the corruption index in levels is in fact
not precisely estimated. The results for the intensive margin reported in the second column
of the same table confirm that offshoring volumes are not affected by either networks or
institutions, conditional on offshoring.
5.4.2 Export outcomes
To gain more insights into the interpretation of our main results, we explore whether our
indexes of institutional costs and the network variable affect firms’ export behavior, measured
by the extensive and intensive margins of exporting. The results are reported in the last
two columns of Table 7 and suggest that the firm’s probability of exporting to a specific
destination market and its export volumes are not affected by the level of labor market
rigidity in the destination country, but they are negatively influenced by the level of credit
risk and corruption. This result acts as an interesting placebo test of our main empirical
analysis. Consistent with our expectations, when shifting the focus from offshoring to the
export decisions of firms, the destination country’s credit risk still matters (as credit risk
also affects exporting firms’ investment decisions), while the destination country’s labor
market institutions have little bearing on export outcomes (as labor market rigidities in
the destination country are not expected to affect exporting firms’ labor costs). Corruption
at the country of destination negatively affects both the extensive and intensive margin of
exporting whereas business regulations are not relevant for export decisions. Furthermore,
our network variable positively only affects the extensive margin of exporting. This last
finding is consistent with the previous trade literature that documents the importance of
immigrants ability to promote trade (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade,
2002; Briant et al., 2014; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
5.4.3 Industry specific results
To check the robustness of our results to any residual differences between labor and capital
intensive industries (which are possibly time-varying and thus are not accounted for in the
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industry fixed effects in the baseline analysis), the first four columns of Table 8 report the
results for labor and capital intensive industries separately. Here, labor (capital) intensive
industries are defined as those with an average capital intensity below (above) the mean
in the midpoint of our sample (i.e., 2009). This definition is used to investigate whether
offshoring firms in labor intensive industries tend to react more to changes in destination
countries’ institutional costs or networks, given that in the large majority of cases, offshoring
is used to reduce labor costs. In line with the main analysis, our index and network variables
do not significantly affect the intensive margin for either group of industries, conditional on
offshoring. As expected, we find that for firms in labor intensive industries, the propensity
to offshore is more responsive to the destination country’s labor market rigidity than it is
for firms in capital intensive industries. In terms of the extensive margin, firms in labor
intensive industries also seem to be more reactive to changes in credit risk than firms in
other industries. The point estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in la-
bor market rigidity in a destination country leads to a 48 percent decrease in the bilateral
probability of offshoring for labor intensive firms, whereas a one standard deviation increase
in credit risk decreases the same probability by half as much. The effects on the extensive
margin for capital intensive firms are respectively a 2.5 percent decrease and approximately
a 3 percent decrease. The coefficient estimated for the business regulations index is never
statistically significant, and the magnitudes involved in the corruption and network variables
are comparable across the two groups of industries.
The sample we used for the baseline estimates included only pure manufacturing firms
because our measure of offshoring (using imported inputs) may be not entirely relevant if
applied to the service industry (Hummels et al., 2014b). However, former pure manufacturing
firms may offshore all of their production activities and thus switch to the service industry.
These “factory-less goods producing” firms (FGPFs) are companies that no longer directly
control the production and assembly of goods in-house but are still involved in design, R&D,
engineering, supervision of third-party production, branding, marketing and distribution
(Bernard and Fort, 2015). The number of firms switching from manufacturing to service
industries is non-negligible and can explain approximately half of the recent decline in Danish
manufacturing employment (Bernard et al., 2017b). This type of extreme offshoring acts as
an incentive to check whether the results are similar if estimated on a sample of service firms.
In line with the main analysis performed on the manufacturing sector, for service firms, we
find that the estimated coefficients for our index of labor market rigidity, credit risk and
corruption are negative and statistically significant in terms of only the extensive margin, as
reported in the last two column of Table 8. In addition, the results for business regulations,
the network variable and its interaction with institutions are consistent with those obtained
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from the sample of manufacturing firms. This result provides clear evidence that performing
the analysis on firms in the service industry does not change the conclusions of the main
analysis.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
5.4.4 Sample specific results
It may be argued that the imports of non-exporting firms are less likely to feature actual
offshoring activities relative to exporting firms’ imports. To check whether our measure of
offshoring is somehow weakened by the presence of non-exporting firms, in Table 9, we re-
estimate our main regression by excluding these firms from the sample. The results obtained
from this refinement confirm the estimated coefficient on all of our variables of interest are
qualitatively very similar to the ones estimated in the main analysis.
Another concern is that our sample of destinations countries is very heterogeneous, e.g.,
in terms of the enforcement capabilities of their political institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Therefore, the response of offshoring to institutional costs or networks may not not be
homogeneous across macro geographical groups. To address this concern, we split the sample
into developed and developing destination countries. The results obtained from these sub-
samples are reported in the last four columns of Table 9. It appears that the impact of
labor market rigidity, credit risk, corruption and networks on offshoring is indeed stronger
for developing destination markets than for developed countries. A one standard deviation
increase in the index of credit risk, for example, triggers a 36 (17) percent increase in the
bilateral extensive margin if we focus on developing (developed) countries as destination
markets.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
5.4.5 Offshoring measures
We now test the consistency of our results by using alternative measures of offshoring in
Table 10. First, in columns 1 and 2, we use a broad offshoring measure defined as the total
value of imports by a firm in a given year, regardless of the industry. As discussed in the
data section, this is not our preferred measure of offshoring; however, the results using this
offshoring definition are similar to our baseline findings, even if the coefficients are higher.
For example, a one standard deviation increase in credit risk in the destination country leads
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to a 20 percent decrease in the probability that a firm will offshore to the same destination
(remember the previous estimate using the narrow definition of offshoring was 10 percent),
but it does not affect the log of offshoring volumes, conditional on offshoring.
Second, we construct a new measure of offshoring using a completely different dataset
compiled by the National Bank of Denmark (Esperian). This dataset includes firm-level
information on outward FDI activity. Specifically, this variable identifies countries in which
Danish firms have majority-owned foreign affiliates. Using this information, we construct an
extensive margin offshoring variable that measures whether a Danish firm has any foreign
affiliates abroad. The benefit of using this approach is that it specifically measures the firm’s
foreign activities. However, this measure does not measure offshoring to foreign arms length
suppliers that are outside the boundaries of the firm. Moreover, the Esperian data does not
indicate whether a particular import transaction originates from a controlled affiliate or an
uncontrolled third party. We are therefore able to check the validity of our main results only
in relation to the extensive margin of offshoring. Finally, the Esperian data are available
only for a sub-sample of our data. The third column of Table 10 reports the results using this
alternative FDI-based offshoring measure. Consistent with our baseline results, we find that
credit risk negatively affects firms’ bilateral probability of offshoring, whereas our network
variable has a positive effect (although marginally significant) on the extensive margin. The
magnitudes involved are, however, much smaller than the baseline results. Furthermore, the
coefficients estimated on the index of labor market rigidity and corruption are not precisely
estimated. The signs of all these coefficients, however, confirm the baseline results.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
6 Conclusions
This paper explores how institutions and networks affect firms’ offshoring outcomes by using
a large and representative sample of manufacturing firms in Denmark over the period 2006-
2012. Our empirical analysis shows that at least two regulatory areas are beneficial for the
extensive margin of offshoring: high fixed offshoring costs are in fact associated with a lack
of credit coverage, poor protection of creditors’ property rights and high levels of corruption.
Accordingly, regulations of the destination market that reduce credit risks and corruption
tend to increase firms’ propensity to offshore. Conversely, regulations that increase labor
market rigidity have a negative impact on firms’ offshoring. Stringent employment protec-
tion measures increase firms’ labor costs, which negatively affect firms’ extensive margin
of offshoring. The impact of these regulations on firms’ intensive margins, conditional on
27
offshoring, is never statistically significant. This result corroborates the hypothesis that in-
stitutions affect the fixed costs of accessing a foreign market. Our results also suggest that
firms’ networks in destination countries have an independent fixed-cost reducing effect on
the extensive margin. Several refinements of the network variable confirm the role played by
foreign workers in promoting offshoring activities at the bilateral level. However, the posi-
tive impact of networks is magnified (attenuated) in destination markets with high levels of
credit risk (corruption).
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Figure 1: Bilateral share of foreign workers and its instrument
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Figure 2: Sectors with the largest share of offshoring firms on average (2006-2012)
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Figure 3: Destination countries with the largest share of offshoring firms on average (2006-
2012)
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Figure 4: Regulations and corruption by destination country in 2006 and 2012
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Figure 5: Destination countries with the highest regulation and corruption indexes
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Figure 6: Extensive margin of offshoring, institutions and network
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Figure 7: Intensive margin of offshoring, institutions and networks
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Figure 8: Marginal effects of networks on the extensive margin of offshoring
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Table 3: Labor, business and credit regulations
Mean Sd Min Max
Labor regulations
Limits on fixed term contracts 0.388 0.487 0 1
Limits on working days per week 1.073 0.319 0 2
Employment protection measures 0.486 0.499 0 1
Minimum wage 0.305 0.251 0 1.779
Index of labor market rigidity -0.067 1.086 -2.702 2
Business regulations
Time to open a business 33.083 34.976 0.500 260
Time to register property 59.878 65.847 1 398
Time to pay taxes 293.562 221.891 0 2085
Time to export 23.633 16.298 6 102
Index of business regulations -0.069 1.072 -1.601 2
Credit regulations
100-Credit coverage 75.952 33.664 0 100
10-Investors’ protection 4.985 2.463 0 10
Enforcing contracts 28.925 12.666 0.100 87.6
100-Resolving insolvency 64.546 23.708 8.800 100
Index of credit risk -0.128 1.286 -3.552 1.900
Corruption index 0.018 1.013 -2.385 2.465
N 1,403,850
Notes: Means and standard deviations are calculated as averages over the period 2006-2012. Labor
regulations are respectively: i) Whether fixed contracts for permanent tasks are forbidden or not;
ii) Maximum number of working days weekly (calculated as 7-maximum number of working days);
iii) Notify/consult a third party to dismiss redundant worker; iv) Minimum wages, ratio of average
wages. Index of labor market rigidity is estimated with principal component analysis by using all
labor regulations. Business regulations are respectively: i) Time required to start a business (days);
ii) Time required to register property (days); iii) Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours); iv) Time to
import (days); v) Time to export (days). Index of business regulations is estimated with principal
component analysis by using all business regulations. Credit regulations are respectively: i) Lack
of credict coverage=100-Private credit bureau coverage (percent of adults); ii) Lack of investors’
protection=10-Business extent of disclosure index (0=less disclosure to 10=more disclosure); iii)
Enforcing contracts, cost (percent of claim); iv) Rate of insolvency=100- recovery rate (cents on
the dollar). Index of credit risk is estimated with principal component analysis by using all credit
regulations. Corruption index is the inverse of the estimated control of corruption indicator.
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Table 7: Institutions and network, the role of non-linearities in the offshoring decisions and
of export outcomes
Offshoring Export
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
[1] [2] [1] [2]
Index of labor market rigidityt−1 –0.004756*** 0.004385 –0.024258 –0.338879
(0.000436) (0.099843) (0.021569) (0.252259)
Index of labor market rigidity2t−1 0.000806*** 0.014632
(0.000260) (0.074298)
Index of business regulationst−1 –0.000215 –0.058580 0.006661 0.074535
(0.000552) (0.086191) (0.004868) (0.045147)
Index of business regulations2t−1 0.000749 –0.043573
(0.000498) (0.034185)
Index of credit riskt−1 –0.003436*** 0.131934 –0.018241*** –0.031200
(0.000636) (0.130959) (0.002045) (0.037783)
Index of credit risk2t−1 0.002544*** 0.002354
(0.000804) (0.062133)
Corruption indext−1 –0.000062 –0.024040 –0.002204** –0.111308**
(0.000547) (0.152086) (0.000962) (0.051552)
Corruption index2t−1 –0.002557*** 0.038669
(0.000869) (0.062198)
Networkt−1 0.019900*** 0.123127 0.027574*** 0.111999
(0.002451) (0.165955) (0.006645) (0.082117)
Network2t−1 –0.002412*** –0.050437
(0.000345) (0.030761)
Mean Y 0.033 10.181 0.036 10.133
R-sq 0.179 0.291 0.385 0.391
N 1,403,850 46,282 1,403,850 144,701
Notes: Dependent variable in column 1 (2) is the extensive (intensive) margin of offshoring. Depen-
dent variable in column 3 (4) is the extensive (intensive) margin of exporting. All regressions show
coefficients estimated on the z-scores of each explanatory variable and refer to the most complete
specification. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-destination-year level. Significance
levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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